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Abstract—Complex networking systems have resources that
are highly dynamic and moreover, programmable; Software
Defined Networking (SDN) is a network management technology
for such systems. We propose a novel preventive approach for
verifying that no misconfigurations (e.g., infinite loops), can
occur given a requested set of paths. This fundamental approach
relies on graph-based formal verification. We discuss how, when
synthesizing a set of data paths, other not requested and undesired
paths may be unintentionally configured; this is showcased on
a small emulated case study using the Onos controller and
Open vSwitches. We present a verification technique for detecting
such misconfigurations; its polynomial complexity highlights the
applicability of the obtained results. Additionally, we propose a
model-based technique for debugging / repairing a set of paths
in such a way that the corrected set does not induce undesired
paths, if the latter is possible.
Index Terms—Software Defined Networking, Verification, Re-
pairing, Graph paths
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional networks have evolved into complex networking
systems that are highly dynamic. One of the technologies that
contributes to this evolution is the Software Defined Network-
ing (SDN) paradigm, that allows implementing various data
paths utilizing the common resources and centralized control
principles. When using SDN, the network entities are managed
through the controller that works independently from the net-
work equipment and is ‘responsible’ for pushing the necessary
rules to the forwarding devices (e.g., switches) [1]. As a result,
SDN provides agile controllability and observability for the
networking system by separating the control and data planes.
In this paper, we focus on verification and validation of such
systems.
To guarantee the network is configured correctly, SDN
components and compositions need to be thoroughly tested
and verified. However, even if the rules are pushed to each
switch as requested by the controller, additional verification
of the data plane still needs to be performed. For example,
one needs to verify i) the absence of loops and packet loss,
as well as ii) the security and access control issues. Works on
such data plane verification have been presented before (see
Section II), moreover, we note that these challenges have been
largely investigated in the past decade. Nevertheless, existing
approaches mostly rely on a current network configuration,
i.e., the rules have been already pushed to the switches while
in this paper, we claim that an efficient verification can be
performed before. In particular, we propose a graph-based
verification approach which relies on the analysis of the paths
to be configured. The reason is that it is highly probable
that the loops and/or access control issues are not induced
through the actual path implementation but rather arise from
the conflicting requests. More precisely, in this paper, we
propose a novel preventive approach for verifying certain
properties of dynamic networking systems. Indeed, given the
set of paths to be implemented on the data plane for connecting
appropriate hosts, if this set is not consistent or can lead to
potential loops then its implementation should be avoided. Let
P be a set of paths which should be implemented on the data
plane for packets of a given traffic type. The set P should
be ‘inspected’ before its actual implementation, first to assure
that all the paths of the set P are edge simple (proves the
correctness of the path definition) and second whether it is
possible to precisely implement the set P on the data plane
or there will be additional (unintended) paths implemented.
In the latter case, it can happen that there are implemented
paths which are not edge simple and thus, a loop for packets
of a given traffic type can occur. In this paper, we answer the
above question by establishing the corresponding necessary
and sufficient conditions. In fact, we show that given a traffic
type which is defined by the packet headers (packets with
the same traffic type follow the same data paths) and a set
of (requested) paths P , the implementation of P can induce
new paths appearing on the data plane, and moreover, if all
the paths of P are edge simple (no loops should occur) it
does not guarantee the absence of potential cycles on the
data plane. Indeed, the verification criterion for the absence
of those relies on the property of the set P to be arc closed
(see Section IV). Such criterion as well as the preventive
verification method on its basis, form the main contributions
of the paper. Note that, our preliminary experimental results
with a small case study emulated with the Onos controller
and Open vSwitches confirm the necessity of such preventive
verification; otherwise, the packets generated at a certain host
can go into an infinite loop and can simply flood the network.
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Together with the data path verification approach, we also
discuss the possibility of an automatic debugging and repairing
of a set P that fails the verification. The latter contribution of
the paper is a technique for the modification of the set of paths
P in such a way, that the resulting set of paths becomes arc
closed (and thus safe to implement). For both, verification and
debugging / repairing approaches their related complexity is
discussed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly
summarizes the related work in the area of SDN data plane ver-
ification w.r.t. various network properties. Section III presents
the necessary background. Section IV discusses the possibility
of inducing undesired paths on the data plane that can cause,
for example, infinite cycles; a small case study showcases this
issue. Correspondingly, the proposed preventive verification
approach for the set of paths P , together with the criterion for
the absence of undesired links and related complexity analysis
is presented in Section V. Automatic debugging and repairing
of the set of paths for which the verification failed, is proposed
in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of (recent) works have been devoted to verifi-
cation and testing of an SDN data plane and related data
paths configured on the data plane. Note that these works
can be intuitively split into several groups. The first group
focuses on the application of formal verification and model
checking approaches to data plane verification; in this case,
classical networks (not necessarily SDN) with related access
control, security and other network properties are considered.
Approaches of the second group tend to focus on active
testing of a data plane via corresponding traffic generation and
monitoring of the forwarding behavior of switches of interest.
There have been also a number of attempts of the application
of model-based testing techniques to various SDN components
and in particular, to the data plane.
As techniques of the first group mostly employ formal ver-
ification and model checking strategies, they mostly differ in
the underlying formalism utilized for describing the specified
behavior and related properties. For that matter, there have
been considered Boolean functions and their satisfiability [2],
symbolic model checking / execution and SMT solving [3],
[4] as well as algebra of sets [5]. Several properties of the
data plane can be checked in this case, such as for example,
reachability issues, absence of loops, etc.
Approaches of the second group have been largely investi-
gated, for example in [6]–[9]. In automatic traffic generation,
the packets / flows to be sent through the switches are
generated at hosts in an active mode such that specific network
failures can be captured when monitoring the data plane.
Existing model-based testing techniques either consider a
given SDN component, such as for example an SDN enabled
switch [10], [11] or an SDN framework as a whole can be
tested [12], [13] and in this case, an appropriate fault model
can be used / proposed.
Note that related works mentioned above cover the network
verification and testing problem when the network is already
configured, i.e., the rules are pushed and one needs to discover
if any of potential network failures can occur. However, such
checks are not simple and moreover, the question arises: why
to push certain rules without a preventive verification that these
rules are not conflicting and they do not lead to potential
network failures? Or otherwise, even if a number of rules have
been already installed, given a certain network configuration,
before adding new ones, leading to new data paths, can we
verify that such addition does not lead to network misconfig-
urations and potential reachability issues? The authors are not
aware of the works related to such preventive analysis, and
in this paper, we address the aforementioned challenges. Note
also, that the authors are not aware of any works related to
automatic repairing of rules / paths to be pushed / configured
on the data plane, and such approach is proposed in this paper.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we study the verification of complex network-
ing systems, in particular those that are based on Software
Defined Networking (SDN). SDN is a networking paradigm
that consists in separating the control and data plane layers
[14]. With a centralized SDN controller, SDN applications can
automatically re-configure the SDN data plane. SDN-enabled
forwarding devices (the components of the data plane) steer
(route / forward) the incoming network packets based on so-
called flow rules installed by the SDN applications (through
the controller). A flow rule consists of three main (functional)
parts: a packet matching part, an action part and a location
/ priority part. The matching part describes the values which
a received network packet should have for a given rule to
be applied. The action part states the operations that the
matched network packets must undergo, while the location
/ priority part controls the hierarchy of the rules using tables
and priorities. Finally, it is important to note that there exists
a special output port for a flow rule, the controller port; when
a packet is sent to the controller, the controller queries the
SDN applications to decide which actions to perform with
the packet in question. As a result, the controller may install
new flow rules, drop or forward the packet to a specific
port. In this paper, we focus on the resulting data paths
(produced by the rules installed at the forwarding devices);
more precisely, we focus on the analysis of such data paths
and the potentially unintended additional data paths resulting
from a configuration. To better outline the working principles
of SDN rules, consider the following rules installed at a given
switch:
ID Priority TCP DST PORT DST IP Action
1 5000 10.0.1.22 OUT(2)
2 5001 22 OUT(3)
3 6000 10.0.1.23 CTRLLR
To simplify our explanation, and without loss of generality
we consider that the rules are installed in the first table of the
SDN-enabled switch (table 0). TCP DST PORT is the TCP
destination port and DST IP is the destination IP (for further
information on basic networking concepts the reader can refer
to [15]). A network packet with the destination IP address
10.0.1.22 and destination TCP port 22 will be forwarded to
the output 2 (due to the higher priority of Rule 1). Likewise,
a network packet with destination IP address 10.0.1.21 and
destination TCP port 22 will be forwarded to port 3 (the
highest priority rule matching the network packet). Finally, if a
network packet going to the destination IP address 10.0.1.23
(and the destination TCP port not equal to 22) arrives, the
switch sends this packet to the controller, asking how to
proceed with the packet; the controller may reply with a new
rule, drop the packet or forward it to a set of ports.
In this paper, the SDN resource topology (data plane) or
resource network connectivity topology (RNCT) is represented
as an undirected graph G = (V,E) where E ⊆ {{a,
b}|a ∈ V & b ∈ V } without multiple edges and self loops.
The set V of nodes represents network devices such as hosts
and switches; the set H is the set of all hosts while S is
the set of all switches, V = H ∪ S, H ∩ S = ∅. Edges of
the graph (the set E) represent connections (links) between
two nodes in G and each link can transmit packets in both
directions. Correspondingly, given an edge between nodes a,
b ∈ E, we write (a, b) if a packet is transmitted from a to b
and (b, a) when it is transmitted from b to a. We reasonably
assume that each host is connected exactly with one switch,
i.e., ∀h ∈ H(deg(h) = 1) & ∃s ∈ S((h, s) ∈ E) where
deg(x) is a function which computes the degree of the node x.
Without loss of generality we also assume that G is connected;
otherwise, each (connected) component can be treated as a
separate network.
In the SDN architecture, the instructions for the data plane
for packets forwarding are provided by SDN applications
through an SDN controller. These instructions (flow rules)
produce so-called data paths, sets of paths which should
carry on corresponding packets, i.e., those paths can have
appropriate parameters according to which the packets are
then forwarded; in other words, each packet belongs to an
appropriate traffic type. When a forwarding rule is installed
on an SDN-enabled switch, a data link from and to other
node adjacent to the switch is created, i.e., a packet accepted
from adjacent nodes (hosts or switches) is forwarded to a
(corresponding) set of ports that are connected to appropriate
ports of other nodes.
A host can generate packets that are forwarded to a single
switch connected with this host. A switch can only forward
packets; moreover, in this paper, we assume that a switch does
not modify the packet header, i.e., the packets traffic type and
payload are not changed through the network. A switch can
forward a packet to several ports, and the set of ports depends
on the traffic type as well as on the input port from which
the packet arrives. Every node a of the graph G (a host or a
switch) has a set of ports which can be input as well as output
and each such port corresponds to some edge at the node a
and vice versa, each edge at the node a is associated with a
corresponding port. Thus, there is one-to-one correspondence
between edges at the node a and the set of its ports. Since G
has no multiple edges nor node (self) loops there is one-to-one
correspondence between the set of ports of a and the set of
neighbor nodes of a. Therefore, without loss of generality, we
can use a neighbor node instead of the port number.
A path pi is a sequence of neighboring nodes of G, i.e., a
path is a sequence1 of nodes such that there is an edge between
neighboring sequence nodes. A path pi = x1 · . . . · xn starts
at the node x1, is finished at the node xn, has length n − 1,
and passes via an arc (xi, xi+1) for i = 1 . . . n− 1. The path
is edge simple if it passes via each arc at most one time: (xi,
xi+1) = (xj , xj+1) =⇒ i = j. The path is node simple if all
its nodes are pairwise different, i.e., xi = xj =⇒ i = j. A
path is complete if its head and tail nodes are hosts and there
are no hosts as intermediate nodes.
An SDN application configures sets of paths (through the
controller) which should transport corresponding packets, i.e.,
those paths can have appropriate parameters (which define
their traffic type) according to which the packets are then
forwarded [16]. The flow rules of a switch can be written
as a mapping of input ports into subsets of output ports. If the
subset of output ports is empty then the switch will ‘drop’ a
packet that arrived at a corresponding input port.
In this paper, we assume that an SDN application configures
the switch tables in such a way that each rule determines
the set of output ports depending on the traffic type and an
input port. As G has no multiple edges it implies that a rule
determines the set of neighboring nodes where a packet has
to be forwarded. We also assume that all the switches have
in their tables only the information sent by the controller, i.e.,
no default rules or external interfaces are considered. For the
sake of simplicity and in fact, without loss of generality for our
purpose, we assume that all the rules have the same priority.
For packets belonging to the same traffic type, we can consider
every rule as a triple (a, s, b) ∈ V ×S×V where a and b are
neighbors of s. This rule says that getting a packet with the
corresponding traffic type from neighbor a, switch s should
send it to the neighbor b. If there are several rules which differ
only in the neighbor b, then switch s performs cloning, i.e., the
incoming packet is transmitted to several neighbors. The set
of rules of all switches is called configuration (for the given
traffic type).
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE GIVEN SET OF COMPLETE PATHS
A. Analyzing paths that can be implemented on the data plane
The set of complete paths that should be implemented
on the data plane is based on a user request or predefined
configuration (by a given application). Correspondingly, before
setting a switch configuration according to a set of paths, it
would be useful to verify whether a given set of paths can be
eventually implemented. Note that hereafter we assume that
the requested set of paths P does not contradict the RNCT
1As usual, we use ‘·’ for denoting the sequence concatenation.
G. A trivial check that P forms a sub-graph of G can be
performed beforehand, if necessary.
When implementing a set of paths P , three options are
possible. 1) P can be implemented as it is and in this case, the
edge simplicity should be verified for the set P . 2) P cannot
be implemented without implementing unintended paths, i.e.,
a superset of P is implemented. In this case, the condition of
the edge simplicity should be checked for this superset. If the
minimal superset of P that can exist on the data plane has
cycling paths, then the set P cannot be implemented (loops
can flood the network) in the given data plane. 3) P cannot
be implemented but the minimal superset of P that can be
implemented satisfies the edge simplicity property. We further
discuss how given a set P of paths, a corresponding switch
configuration is specified and given a switch configuration,
which paths are induced by this configuration.
a) Complete paths induce switch rules: When imple-
menting rules for a complete path (for the given traffic type)
α · a · b · c · β where a, b, c ∈ V, α, β ∈ V ∗, we need a rule
(a, b, c), i.e., a switch b once getting a packet belonging to this
traffic type from the neighbor a has to send it to the neighbor
c. Formally, the set P of paths induces the set P↓ of rules:
∀a ∈ V, b ∈ S, c ∈ V, α ∈ V ∗, β ∈ V ∗
α · a · b · c ·β ∈ P implies that there is a rule (a, b, c) ∈ P↓.
b) Switch rules induce paths: The rule (a, b, c) induces
a path a · b · c of length 2. If there is a path α · x · y and there
is a rule (x, y, z) then there is a path α · x · y · z. Formally,
a switch configuration P↓ induces the set of complete paths,
written P↓↑:
∀bj ∈ V
(a1, b1, b2), (b1, b2, b3), . . . , (bn−1, bn, a2) ∈ P ↓ where a1
and a2 are the only hosts, there is a path a1 · b1 · b2 . . . · bn−1 ·
bn · a2 in P↓↑.
By definition, the set P↓↑ has only complete paths. By the
definition of P↓ and P↓↑, the following statement holds.
Proposition 1. Given a switch b, for each rule (a, b, c) ∈ P↓
of this switch, there is a path α · a · b · c · β ∈ P↓↑ for some
α and β.
We now discuss the features of the set P ↓↑. If there are
two paths α · x · y · β and α′ · x · y · β′ in the set P ↓↑ of
complete paths, then according to the above rules, there are
paths α ·x ·y ·β′ and α′ ·x ·y ·β. Consider the case when α and
α′ are not empty, i.e., x is a switch. If β and β′ are not empty
then according to the prefix of the path, switch x, once getting
a packet passed the path α or the path α′, sends the packet
to switch y. According to the postfix, switch y, once getting
a packet from switch x, sends it to the starting point of the
paths β and β′, and the packet passes the paths β and β′. If β
and β′ are empty, then y is a host and the packet passes both
paths α · x · y and α′ · x · y Therefore, the following statement
holds.
Proposition 2. Given a switch configuration P↓, P↓ induces
the set of complete paths P↓↑ with the following features:
∀α, α′, β, β′ ∈ V ∗
α · x · y · β ∈ P ↓↑ & α′ · x · y · β′ ∈ P ↓↑ implies
α · x · y · β′ ∈ P↓↑.
According to Proposition 2, the set of data paths on the
data plane induced by the given set P is exactly P↓↑, and in
fact, it is the actual set of paths that gets implemented when
requesting to implement the set P .
The set P of complete paths is closed with respect to a given
arc (x, y) if for each two paths α ·x · y ·β and α′ ·x · y ·β′ of
the set P which have a common arc (x, y), paths α · x · y · β′
and α′ ·x ·y ·β are also in P . The set P of paths is arc closed
if P is closed w.r.t. each arc over the set E. Given a set P of
complete paths, the arc closure of P is the smallest arc closed
set of complete paths that contains P .
According to the definition of an arc closed set and Propo-
sition 2, the following statement can be established.
Proposition 3. Given a set P of complete paths, the set P↓↑
is the arc closure of P .
Corollary 1. The set P↓↑ coincides with P if and only if P
is arc closed.
Corollary 2. If P has only simple edge paths and is arc closed
then P↓↑ has only simple edge paths.
According to Corollary 1, the set P can be implemented on
the data plane (up to the equality relation) if and only if P is
arc closed, i.e., Corollary 1 establishes necessary and sufficient
conditions for the precise implementation of set P on the data
plane (without additional ‘undesired’ paths).
If P is not arc closed then P cannot be implemented on the
data plane (up to the equality relation). Moreover, sometimes
P cannot be implemented on the data plane at all as its arc
closure has some cycling paths. Figure 1 shows an example
when the set P has two edge simple paths α and β from initial
host h0 to the final host h1 (left of the figure), the set of rules
induced by this set is shown at the bottom and an induced
path γ of the set P ↓↑ is illustrated at the right. The path is
not edge simple, and this example illustrates that cycles can
occur even when paths of the set P are node simple.
Similar to P , all the paths of the set P↓↑ are complete paths.
However, if P ↓↑ is a proper superset of P then we have to
check whether all the paths of the set P↓↑ are edge simple. If
it is the case then the set P can be implemented on the data
plane up to the set P↓↑ (i.e., with additional unspecified paths
from P↓↑ \P ). If it is not the case then the set P should be
modified and this issue is discussed in Section VI.
From the practical point of view, perhaps the most inter-
esting application is when some set P ↓↑ of paths is already
implemented on the data plane while a request arrives to add
new paths to this set. In this case, the same check should be
performed before implementing new paths, guaranteeing the
implementability of the augmented set of paths. Algorithm 1
summarizes the necessary verification steps (Section V) and
returns the corresponding verdict about the implementability
of a given set of paths.
s1 s2 s3 h1
h0 s4 s5 s6
Paths to be
implemented:
α
β
An induced
path:
γ
s1 s2 s3 h1
h0 s4 s5 s6
P ={α = h0 · s1 · s2 · s3 · s4 · s5 · s6 · h1, β = h0 · s1 · s4 · s5 · s2 · s3 · s6 · h1}
P↓={(h0, s1, s2), (s1, s2, s3), (s2, s3, s4), (s3, s4, s5), (s4, s5, s6), (s5, s6, h1),
(h0, s1, s4), (s4, s5, s2), (s5, s2, s3), (s2, s3, s6), (s3, s6, h1)}
γ =h0 · s1 · s2 · s3 · s4 · s5 · s2 · s3 · s4 · s5 · . . . · s2 · s3 · s4 · s5 · s6 · h1 ∈ P↓↑
Fig. 1. Induced (cyclic) paths occurrence
B. Practical / Experimental motivation: a case study with the
Onos controller
It is worth noting that though the approach presented above
is theoretical, the implications for real SDN frameworks are
substantial. Indeed, if two loopless paths can induce (in-
finitely) more paths, the performance and security of such
frameworks can be highly compromised. In order to verify if
our (fundamental) findings can occur in real SDN framework
implementations, an experimental evaluation was performed; a
small topology with the Onos controller and Open vSwitches
was utilized as a case study.
Experimental setup. Experiments were carried in a virtual
machine running GNU/Linux CentOS 7.6 with 8 vCPUs and
16GB of RAM. The Onos [17] SDN controller (version 4.2.8)
was installed via a Docker [18] container. To emulate the
SDN data plane, the Containernet [19] was also installed
through a Docker container. The emulated network (as shown
in Figure 1) seen by the Onos controller is shown in Figure 2.
The paths shown in Figure 1 were configured independently,
successful communication from h0 to h1 was discovered
using the data path discovery tool presented in [9] and the
discovered paths are shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, there
is no problem while configuring both paths independently.
When both paths are configured simultaneously, the loop was
effectively produced. A single packet sent from h0 to h1
produced infinitely many of them. In Figure 4, we show the
packet capture (using the well-known utility tcpdump) as seen
by h1. Note that, the packet sent is an ICMP echo request
(using the ping utility), and the sequence ID is always 1,
as the single packet gets copied infinitely many times. When
continuously sending the packets the network rapidly degraded
until the whole infrastructure became unusable.
These experiments confirm the importance of our findings.
It is important to provide SDN frameworks with verification
tools before rules are pushed to the switches. One of the
procedures for such verification is given in Algorithm 1. Note
that, Corollary 1 provides a criterion for effective verification
of the set of paths P . However, for that matter the P↓↑ (the
arc closure of P ) needs to be derived as well, and this issue
is discussed in the next section.
V. CHECKING THE ARC CLOSURE
In this section, we propose an algorithm for checking if a
given set of paths P induces unintended paths, i.e., a superset
of P will be implemented (when P is intended); likewise,
we discuss how to detect potential cycles induced by the
implementation of P .
Algorithm 1 shows the verification steps necessary to check
the arc closure of a given set of paths. Given the set P of
complete paths in the graph G, we construct a directed graph
D(P ). Vertices of D(P ) are arcs of paths from P and there
is an arc ((a, b), (b, c)) in D(P ) if and only if P has a path
α · a · b · c · β where α and β are not empty sequences. There
are two special nodes in D(P ), the initial node source, and
the final node sink. Since P contains only complete paths,
in the graph D(P ), there is an edge from the source vertex
to a head pair (a, b) of each path where a is a host, while
there is an edge to the sink node from the tail pair (c, d) of
each path, where d is a host. The path source · (h1, s2) · (s2,
s3) · . . . · (sm−1, hm) · sink in the graph D(P ) starting at
the source vertex and ending at the sink vertex corresponds
to the complete path h1 · s2 · s3 · . . . · sm−1 · hm in the
graph G where h1 and hm are the only hosts. The set of
such complete paths in the graph G, corresponding to the
paths in the graph D(P ) from source to sink, is precisely
the closure of the set P . If the number of such paths in
D(P ) is greater than cardinality of the set P , this means
that the closure expands the set P . The detailed verification
procedure is shown in Algorithm 1 and Proposition 4 (valid
by construction) establishes the correctness of the algorithm.
Proposition 4. Algorithm 1 returns the verdict True if and
only if P is arc closed.
Consider the example in Figure 1, the graph D(P ) con-
structed by Algorithm 1 is the following. The set of ver-
tices is {source, (s1, s2), (s1, s4), (s2, s3), (s5, s2), (s3, s4),
(s3, s6), (s4, s5), (s5, s6), sink} and the corresponding graph
is shown in Figure 5. By direct inspection one can assure that
there is a cycle (s2, s3), (s3, s4), (s4, s5), (s5, s2) in the graph
and thus, the number of paths from the vertex source to the
vertex sink is infinite, i.e., is bigger than the number two of
paths in the set P , and therefore, the set P is not arc closed
as it is demonstrated in Figure 1.
Fig. 2. Onos topology view
α
β
Fig. 3. Discovered data paths (α and β)
Fig. 4. Packet capture showing an infinite loop in the experimental infrastructure
Proposition 5. The complexity of checking the absence of
cycles for a given set of paths P is O(L + |V |3) where |V |
is the number of nodes in G and L is the sum of the lengths
of the paths in P .
Proof. The complexity of constructing the graph D(P ) is
O(L) where L is the sum of the lengths of the paths from P .
In order to check for (infinite) loops, the absence of oriented
cycles in the graph G(P ) needs to be checked, which is
done through a topological sort (e.g., using depth first search
(DFS) [20]). DFS-algorithm can also be used for computing
the number of paths from the source to the sink node when
there are no cycles. The running time of the depth first search
algorithm on the graph G(P ) is evaluated as O(m), where m
is the number of arcs of the graph D(P ), m ≤ |V |3.
VI. DEBUGGING AND REPAIRING A SET OF PATHS
In this section, we discuss some possibilities of correcting
/ modifying the set of paths P whenever this set is not arc
closed. One first needs to identify the reason, i.e., a subset
of paths that destroy the corresponding property and the set
of paths P should be either augmented with new paths or
on the contrary, certain paths should be deleted from the set
P . In both ways, the resulting subset becomes arc closed
and thus, can be implemented on the data plane without any
unintended paths. We later on refer to this process as automatic
P debugging and repairing. We note, that such repairing
process can have various objectives, such as for example:
minimization of the number of paths to be excluded / included
from / to P , maximization of a host to host connectivity
in the resulting set of paths, minimization of the number of
source
(h0, s1) (s1, s2) (s2, s3)
(s1, s4)
(s3, s4)
(s3, s6)
(s5, s2)
(s4, s5) (s6, h1)
sink
(s5, s6)
Fig. 5. Graph D(P ) for verifying the set of paths P
Algorithm 1: Verifying if the set of paths P is arc closed
Input : A set P of edge simple complete paths
Output: A verdict whether the set P is arc closed
Derive a subset Q = {q1, . . . , qk} of P that contains all
the paths of length greater than two; we denote as kj
the length of a path qj , j ∈ {1, . . . , k};
Derive a graph D(P ) =< D,E > for the set Q where
the vertices of D(P ) are pairs of vertices of the paths
in Q;
D = {source, sink}; E = ∅;
j = 0;
while j < k do
j ++;
D = D ∪ {(qj(1), qj(2)), (qj(kj), qj(kj + 1))};
E = E ∪ {(source, (qj(1), qj(2)), (qj(kj),
qj(kj + 1)), sink)};
m = 2;
while m < kj + 1 do
D = D ∪ {(qj(m), qj(m+ 1))};
E = E ∪ {((qj(m− 1), qj(m)), (qj(m),
qj(m+ 1)))};
m++;
if the number of paths in D(P ) from source to sink is
greater than k then
return False;
return True;
changes in the paths of the set, minimization of virtual links
on the data plane, etc. We furthermore discuss some of the
possibilities listed above and propose various debugging and
repairing strategies.
A. Minimizing the set of paths to be excluded / included from
/ to P
Given a set P of complete paths, let P = {p1, . . . , pk}, i.e.,
k = |P |, and ki = |pi| − 1 is the length of pi for i = 1, . . . k.
The problems we address in this subsection are the following:
how to delete / add a minimal number of paths from / to the
set P , such that the resulting subset / superset becomes arc
closed.
We say that two different paths pi and pj of P are
incompatible if there exists a common arc, i.e., there exist
u ∈ {1, . . . , ki − 1} and v ∈ {1, . . . , kj − 1} such that
pi(u) = pj(v)&pi(u + 1) = pj(v + 1) while a path
pi(1) · · · · · pi(u) · pj(v + 1) · · · · · pj(kj + 1) or a path
pj(1) · · · · · pj(v) · pi(u + 1) · · · · · pi(ki + 1) is not in P .
In this case, one can also say that pi and pj are incompatible
w.r.t. the common arc (a, b) = (pi(u), pi(u+1)). If pi and pj
of P are not incompatible, then they are compatible.
The problem of deleting a minimal number of paths can be
reduced to the well known maximum independent set problem.
For that matter, we propose to derive an undirected graph
G(P ) in the following way: the nodes of the graph correspond
to the paths of the set P . There is an arc between pi and
pj , i 6= j, in the graph G(P ) if the paths pi and pj are
incompatible.
Given an undirected graph G(P ), note that a subset of nodes
which are not pairwise connected is an independent subset of
nodes. Therefore, by construction, the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 6. An independent subset of nodes of graph G(P )
is an arc closed set.
Corollary 3. A subset of P is arc closed if and only if it is
an independent subset of the graph G(P ).
Therefore, the problem of minimizing the set of paths to be
excluded from P is reduced to the derivation of a maximal
independent subset of nodes in G(P ). Note that this problem
is known to be NP-hard, and thus the repairing approach can
be more complex than the one presented for the verification
itself (Section V).
As an example, consider again the paths of the set P in Fig-
ure 1. Note that the paths of P possess the necessary feature,
i.e., they have a common arc (s2, s3) with the above property
and the set P has no path h0·s1·s2·s3·s4·s5·s2·s3·s4·s5·s6·h1.
Therefore, the corresponding vertices in G(P ) are connected,
i.e., P is not arc closed and only the singletons {α} or {β}
are arc closed.
For deriving a minimal superset of P that is arc closed the
graph D(P ) derived in the previous subsection can be used.
If the graph returned by Algorithm 1 has no cycles then the
set of all paths from the source node to the sink node is the
smallest superset of P that is arc closed. Correspondingly, the
following statement holds.
Proposition 7. 1. If all the paths from the source node to the
sink node in D(P ) are edge-simple then the set of these paths
is the smallest superset of P that is arc closed. 2. If there a
path from the source node to the sink node in D(P ) that is
not edge-simple then there is no finite superset of P that is
arc closed.
Note that in case 2, it is not possible to add paths to the
given set P ; the set P can be only reduced as it is discussed at
the beginning of the subsection. Indeed, it is exactly the case
for the set P in Figure 1.
B. Minimizing the number of arc changes in the set P
Consider a set P of edge-simple complete paths that is not
arc closed. The question arises: can the paths of the set be
minimally corrected (w.r.t. the number of arcs) in order to get
an arc closed set preserving the head and tail hosts of each
path? In this section, we propose a simple way for modifying
a single edge or a sub-path of a path using edges of the RNCT
graph G which were not utilized in the paths of P (the set N
in Algorithm 2).
By construction, the following statement holds.
Proposition 8. Given a set P of edge-simple complete paths,
if Algorithm 2 returns a set Q = {p1, p′2, . . . , p′k} then this
set is arc closed and for each j = 1, . . . , k, the head and tail
vertices of p′j coincide with those of pj .
Note that in Algorithm 2, we consider only simple heuristics
for repairing a path; moreover, the result significantly depends
on the order of the paths in P . More research is needed to
propose more rigorous conditions for repairing a set of initial
paths that is not arc closed. Those conditions can be related to
certain properties as the link load distribution and thus, could
re-direct some packets, for example, for traffic optimization.
As an example, consider again the paths in Figure 1,
assuming that each pair of switches is connected in the RNCT
G. These paths have a common arc (s4, s5) that can be
replaced by a path s4 ·s6 ·s5. After this modification the paths
have a common arc (s2, s3) that can be replaced by a path
Algorithm 2: Repairing via modifying an edge or a sub-
path preserving the head and tail hosts of the path
Input : A set P of edge-simple complete paths that is
not arc closed, a non-empty set N of edges
between switches of the RNCT graph G which
are not used in the paths of the set P
Output: A verdict False if paths cannot be modified, or
a modified arc closed set P where the head and
tail vertices of each modified path p′j coincide
with those of the initial path pj of P
Q = {p1};
j = 2;
while j ≤ |P | do
p′j = pj ;
l = 1;
while l ≤ |Q| do
p = ql;
if paths p and p′j are incompatible w.r.t. P then
if N = ∅ then
return False;
else
while the paths p and p′j are incompatible
w.r.t. the common arc (s1, s2) do
if the paths p and p′j have a common
sub-path s3 · α · s1 · s2 · β · s4 and
(s3, s4) is in N then
Derive p′j by replacing a sub-path
s3 · α · s1 · s2 · β · s4 in p′j by a
sub-path s3 · s4;
Delete (s3, s4) from the set N ;
else if There is a switch s3 such that
(s1, s3), (s3, s2) ∈ N then
Derive p′j by replacing a sub-path
s1 · s2 in p by a sub-path
s1 · s3 · s2;
Delete (s1, s3) and (s3, s2) from
the set N ;
else
return False;
l ++;
Add p′j to the set Q;
j ++;
return an arc closed set Q = {p1, p′2, . . . , p′k}
s2 · s4 · s3. Thus, we obtain an arc closed set of paths P ′ =
{h0 ·s1 ·s2 ·s3 ·s4 ·s5 ·s6 ·h1, h0 ·s1 ·s4 ·s6 ·s5 ·s2 ·s4 ·s3 ·s6 ·h1}.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied graph-based verification of com-
plex networking systems. In particular, we discussed some
implementability issues for a given set of paths on an SDN
data plane. We showed that for a fixed traffic type, whenever
the requested set contains only edge simple paths, more (unin-
tended) paths can still be implemented on the data plane, and
some of those can create cycles, i.e., infinite packet loops. We
therefore established the necessary and sufficient conditions
to verify that a set of requested paths can be implemented
without any undesired connections and hence, potential loops.
Our preventive verification approach is based on the analysis
of the set of paths to be arc closed that in fact guarantees
its ‘clean’ (exact) implementability; this can be useful for
guaranteeing that new (requested) and preexisting paths form
valid configurations. The estimated (polynomial w.r.t. the total
paths length) complexity of the proposed approach emphasizes
its applicability for large scale virtual networks. At the same
time, for a set of paths that cannot be implemented directly on
the data plane, we proposed a debugging / repairing approach
for correcting the initial request, such that the resulting set
becomes arc closed.
As future work, we plan to extend the proposed veri-
fication and repairing approaches abstracting from a given
traffic type, i.e., considering sets of paths that share certain
parameters of the packet header. Complexity issues in this case
form maybe the main challenge, and thus we plan to study
certain properties of various headers partitioning to check
the implementability of a given set of paths. Moreover, it
can be interesting to consider other kinds of specifications
for user requests, such as for example, given pairs of hosts
to be connected on the data plane, one needs to face the
implementability challenges again. Finally, we also plan to
verify different functional and non-functional properties of the
set of paths to be implemented, for example, to check security
/ isolation issues.
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